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There are two aspects of persons, which are 
predominant in contemporary philosophy, one being 
epistemological and the other moral. The first aspect 
focuses on problems of continuity and personal identity, 
the second on questions of moral responsibility. Both 
aspects are related to the double meaning of the Latin 
word “persona”, which stood, roughly, first for the role 
someone plays in a system - be it on stage or in society - 
and later, under the influence of Christian traditions, was 
used to express someone’s uniqueness and individuality. 
But there are further aspects of what is essential for a 
person, aspects, which, although having been paid 
attention to in the past, are now rather neglected. These 
are a person’s development, free will, and personality. I 
want to show here how Kant’s theory of aesthetic 
contemplation and Wittgenstein’s notion of language 
games are useful for a better understanding of these 
aspects of a person. 
Parfit in 1987 distinguished between two 
questions: (1) “What is the nature of a person?” and (2) 
“What makes a person at two different times one and the 
same person? What is necessarily involved in the 
continued existence of each person over time?” Parfit 
concentrates on the second question, because “in 
answering (2) we shall also partly answer (1). The 
necessary features of our continued existence depend 
upon our nature. And the simplest answer to (1) is that, to 
be a person, a being must be self-conscious, aware of its 
identity and its continued existence over time.” (Parfit, p. 
202) But this “simplest answer” is not only simple, it is also 
one-sided. Already in 1971 Harry G. Frankfurt pointed out 
that “what philosophers have lately come to accept as 
analysis of the concept of a person is not actually analysis 
of that concept at all” (Frankfurt, 5). Frankfurt criticizes 
philosophers for having been too much concerned with 
mind-body issues and having forgotten what is “of our 
most humane concern with ourselves and the source of 
what we regard as most important and most problematical 
in our lives” (6), which, according to Frankfurt, is a 
person’s free will. He therefore develops an account of our 
capacity of “reflective self-evaluation” (7) and our ability to 
form “second order desires” (6). These abilities are 
intimately related to the aspects I am going to point out 
here. 
Kant’s theory of aesthetic contemplation and 
Wittgenstein’s notion of language games share three 
features that are essential to the development of a person. 
These are the features of openness, indeterminacy, and 
exemplarity.  
 
1 According to Kant’s aesthetics, when we make a 
judgment of taste, we engage in what Kant called a “free 
play of the faculties of cognition imagination and 
understanding”. In a state of aesthetic contemplation we 
play with possibilities of different ways of perceiving and 
combining what is given to our senses. We are open to 
varieties of possibilities of what the object could be, we are 
free from conceptual constraints, and instead of concepts 
and rules we rely on mere “purposiveness”. Furthermore, 
according to Kant, we regard our judgment of taste as 
“exemplary” for others. That is, if we make a judgment of 
taste, this judgment will have to be based on the right kind 
of free play and we will think of this play and our judgment 
as being exemplary for others. What I can do, others can 
do as well. Whoever hears that music should be able to 
appreciate it in the way I do. At least I make that claim. In 
fact, others often do not follow our example, but still, I 
make the claim that they should. Geniuses, for instance, 
are often not understood by their contemporaries. 
In such a state of aesthetic contemplation we 
exercise those very abilities by means of which we reflect 
and evaluate in general, not only in the case of aesthetic 
appreciation, but also in cases of moral decision-making 
and decision-making in general. Our ability to be self-
conscious and to be aware of our own identity is practiced 
and refined through aesthetic contemplation when we 
enjoy and “feel” ourselves (Kant, par. 1, 204). 
Furthermore, the two meanings of the word 
persona, the individual and the role we play in society, can 
be found in Kant’s account of judgments of taste. When we 
make a judgment of taste, we reach out to others and want 
them to agree with us: “[I]f someone likes something and is 
conscious that he himself does so without any interest, 
then he cannot help judging that it must contain a basis for 
being liked [that holds] for everyone” (Kant, par. 6, 212). 
Although we feel the pleasure as an individual - it is always 
only my pleasure (or displeasure) and not yours - we at the 
same time think of other human beings as well. This 
exercises the ability to “think from the standpoint of 
everyone else” (Kant, par. 40, 294), which is necessary in 
reflecting upon our intentions and actions and their 
consequences and moral values. Kant therefore called 
beauty a “symbol for morality” (Kant, par. 51, 351). 
 
2 What Kant wrote in his third Critique had an 
effect on people’s ideas about education. Schiller, Goethe, 
and Humboldt, for instance not only read Kant’s aesthetics, 
they were also moved by it and helped shaping the 
educational institutions in Europe. Schiller wrote in his 
influential “Letters about the Aesthetic Education of Man” 
[Ueber die aesthetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer 
Reihe von Briefen] that a being is human only when and in 
so far as it plays [er ist nur da ganz Mensch, wo er spielt, 
letter 15]. When Schiller wrote this, he was inspired by 
Kant’s rather abstract idea of the free play of the cognitive 
faculties. Furthermore, Kant thought of this play as being 
“harmonious”, and this idea, too, left its traces in Schiller’s 
writings: “Taste alone brings harmony into society, 
because it creates harmony in individuals” [Der 
Geschmack allein bringt Harmonie in die Gesellschaft, weil 
er Harmonie in den Individuen stiftet, letter 29]. Similarly, 
the two aspects of a person (persona), its individuality and 
its role in society, which we could find in Kant’s aesthetics, 
are again the object of reflection in Schiller’s writings: “It is 
the beautiful alone that we enjoy at the same time as 
individual and as species, i.e., as representative of the 
species” [Das Schoene allein geniessen wir als Individuum 
und als Gattung zugleich, d.h. als Repraesentant der 
Gattung, letter 27]. 
The idea of education in the sense of “Bildung” 
was strong and influential during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries in Europe. We find it not only in 
writings by Schiller, but also in Rousseau’s “Emile”, 
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Goethe’s “Wilhelm Meister’s Lehrjahre”, and other popular 
writings in the tradition of the Bildungsroman (or “novel of 
development”). The idea of the Bildungsroman was that a 
young man must grow up to become an individual and 
autonomous self, a unique organic unity that is open to the 
world and that unfolds itself in ways that are unique among 
human beings and that form his personal history. All this 
was considered to be part of what makes a person, and 
very little of this can be found in contemporary discussions 
about persons. 
 
3 When Kant wrote his third Critique, he somewhat 
softened his rather rigid and systematic style of doing 
philosophy. He moved somewhat away from the rigidity of 
concepts and rules, and he opened himself to the 
relevance of indeterminacy, exemplarity, and mere 
purposiveness. But he restricted the relevance of such 
aspects to aesthetics and teleology. The later Wittgenstein 
was more radical than Kant. He questioned the nature of 
rules in general, not only in matters of aesthetics and 
teleology, but also in epistemology. All language games 
are parts of “forms of life” (Wittgenstein, 1958, par. 23, 11). 
It is not only in making judgments of taste that we refer to 
our “feeling of life” (Kant, par. 1, 204). Furthermore, 
whereas Kant was confined by his transcendental 
framework and looked for a priori grounds and therefore 
considered only the individual and the universal, 
Wittgenstein drew attention to particular empirical cases 
and communities, societies, cultures, and histories. 
Wittgenstein stressed the differences: “Suppose Lewy has 
what is called a cultured taste in painting. This is 
something entirely different to what was called a cultured 
taste in the fifteenth century. An entirely different game 
was played. He does something entirely different with it to 
what a man did then.” (Wittgenstein, 9) 
Despite many fundamental differences between 
Kant and Wittgenstein, the aspects of openness, 
indeterminacy, and exemplarity can be found in Kant’s 
aesthetics as well as in Wittgenstein’s notion of language 
games. In matters of art as well as in learning a language 
game, we follow examples, there are no determinate rules, 
and there is always room for misunderstanding and re-
interpretation. There are always new geniuses and there 
are always new language games. Both philosophers have 
stressed this point. To develop into a person, we have to 
make many decisions in the courses of our lives. Often we 
have to decide in one way or another, although it seems to 
us that we do not have enough information to ensure that 
we are making the right decision. The ability to reflect and 
to choose in such situations of under-determinacy has to 
be developed -- and Wittgenstein never tired of pointing 
out how many such situations there are in our everyday 
lives. This ability to reflect can be found in aesthetic 
contemplation and in the interpretation of language games, 
and practicing this ability makes self-consciousness and 
our awareness of our personal identity and continuity 
potentially more effective.  
Although it is true that being in a state of aesthetic 
contemplation or being involved in a language game, we 
do not need to be aware of our existence as identical over 
time, it is also true that through such activities we learn 
how to live with indeterminacy and openness and thus 
develop into a more fully grown and competent person. 
When we follow examples or when we give an example 
ourselves, for others or ourselves to follow, we continually 
have to make interpretations and re-interpretations. 
Following an example is not the same as being determined 
by rules. In fact, as Wittgenstein pointed out, following a 
rule is much more like following examples than we thought. 
He thus extended parts of what Kant did for the judgment 
of taste to all kinds of judgments. By making us more 
aware of certain problems of the nature of rules in general, 
Wittgenstein made it possible for us to see the relevance 
of Kant’s aesthetics for epistemology. 
The features of openness, indeterminacy, and 
exemplarity are part of Kant’s notion of “freies Spiel” as 
well as Wittgenstein’s notion of “Sprach-Spiel”. It is not 
only a word they share. More importantly here, these 
features of openness, indeterminacy, and exemplarity are 
necessary elements in the development of a person, and 
although they have been much in the center of discussion 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe, most 
philosophers talking about persons nowadays tend to pay 
almost no attention to them. There is still much truth in 
Frankfurt’s criticism from 1971, namely that “what 
philosophers have lately come to accept as analysis of the 
concept of a person is not actually analysis of that concept 
at all” (Frankfurt, 5). I have tried to show here that we need 
to go even further than Frankfurt. Not only the notion of 
free will, but also elements of aesthetic education are 
relevant to what makes a person.  
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